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THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEA VE A CT:
WELL MEANING LEGISLATION MEETS THE
STRONG ARM OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES
Elizabeth A. Simmons*
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional!
- Chief Justice John Marshall
Congress, under Article I of the Constitution, has the power to enact
legislation that is necessary and proper to carry out any of the specific
2legislative powers granted in the Constitution. Section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to enact legislation to
enforce the provisions of the Amendment
Congress' legislative powers, however, often conflict with the States'
autonomy to govern. Both the history of the Constitution and the
Eleventh Amendment demonstrate that the States are sovereign entities.4
State sovereignty is protected by making States immune from certain suits
* Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, candidate for Juris
Doctor May 2001; Wake Forest University, Bachelor of Arts May 1998. The
author wishes to thank Professor Roger Hartley for his guidance, the Journal staff
for their hard work and her family for their support in the process of writing this
article.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
2. Id.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment says, in pertinent parts:
Section 1. ... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws....
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
4. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1890) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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by individuals. 5 An action against a State may only be brought if the State
has waived its sovereign immunity6 or if Congress has abrogated the
State's immunity. Congress can abrogate the States' immunity from suit
8by individuals through its Section five power.
When Congress exercises its Section five power, questions sometimes
arise with respect to the validity of its action. The question of validity
arises when considering the Family and Medical Leave Act.9 The Family
and Medical Leave Act is designed to require that all employers,
including States, grant employees conditional leave for personal and
family medical emergencies. 0 Congress enacted this legislation pursuant
to both its commerce and Section five powers.! The Family and Medical
Leave Act creates a private right of action for employees, to bring against
a State, in either state or federal courts.1
Part I of this Comment describes the basic provisions in the Act. This
part summarizes the statutory history of the Family and Medical Leave
Act and gives particular attention to the Congressional findings and
testimony made before Senate and House committees.
Part II examines the States' sovereign immunity. This part examines
the sources of sovereign immunity, how the adoption of the Eleventh
5. Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-13.
6. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
7. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 640 (2000). In this recent
decision, the court held that in order to determine whether Congress properly
abrogated the States' immunity from suit, two questions must be answered: "first,
whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity;
and second, if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of
constitutional authority." Id. A detailed discussion regarding the scope of this test
will be discussed later in this Comment.
8. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (1993).
10. Id.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (1993). The State serves a dual role in America.
Each State functions as a sovereign entity, with power to govern its residents
through legislation. Each State also functions as an employer, providing jobs,
benefits, and paychecks for employees within different levels of government. As
an employer, each State is subject to federal laws governing employment,
including minimum wage laws, maximum work-week hour limitations and the
Family and Medical Leave Act. Where the State employment law provides for
private suit as a remedy for a violation, the Family and Medical Leave Act
provides for damage suits against the State, sued in its capacity as an employer by
the aggrieved employee.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(2) (1993).
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Amendment protects sovereign immunity, and how Congress may
abrogate the States' immunity through legislation. This part first looks at
sovereign immunity from a historical perspective. It includes an in-depth
analysis of proper constitutional abrogation by Congress under its powers
granted by the Fourteenth Amendment. This analysis then describes the
necessary steps Congress must follow to abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity. First, Congress must have constitutional authority. Second,
Congress' intent must be unmistakably clear. Finally, the exercise of the
power must be valid under the circumstances. The evaluation of the steps
of a valid exercise of Congress' abrogation power entails an analysis of the
United States Supreme Court's recent holdings of Kimel v. Florida Board
of Regents3 (2000), Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida14 (1996) and City
of Boerne v. Flores15 (1997) and of how these decisions affect the holding
of Katzenbach v. Morgan 6 Specifically, the analysis focuses on the test of
congruence and proportionality required by Flores.7
Part III examines whether the Family and Medical Leave Act remains a
valid exercise of the Section five power as a result of the recent Supreme
Court decisions. This Comment argues that, under the contemporary
interpretation of the Section five power, the Family and Medical Leave
Act is unconstitutional to the extent that it provides a private right of
action for damages against the States. Part III establishes that although
Congress' intent to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from private
suit is unmistakably clear, and although Congress plainly intended to
invoke its Section five power, the legislation is not a congruent and
proportional means of enforcing the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE ACT
A. The Provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act
The Family and Medical Leave Act provides eligible employees with an
entitlement of up to twelve work-weeks of conditional leave in a twelve-
month period." If an employer meets certain criteria, it must provide
13. 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000).
14. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
15. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
16. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
17. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1993).
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leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act.1 9 First, an employer must
engage in a business that somehow "affects commerce., 20 Second, it must
employ at least fifty employees for every workday during twenty work-
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.2 The term employer
includes not only the owner of the business, but also "any person who
acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the
employees of such employer; and.., any successor in interest of an
employer.""
An employee must also meet the statutory prerequisites to be eligible
for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. 3 First, an employee
must have been employed for at least one year by the employer from
whom he or she is requesting leave.24 Second, the employee must have
worked at least 1250 hours in the same twelve-month period with that
19. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (1993).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(i) (1993).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(i). See, e.g., Paleologos v. Rehab Consultants, Inc.,
990 F. Supp. 1460, 1468 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that plaintiff must show that
employer hired at least fifty employees at plaintiff's worksite or within a seventy-
five mile radius of the worksite to recover under the Family and Medical Leave
Act).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(ii) (1993). The courts differ in their interpretation of
what constitutes an employer under the Family and Medical Leave Act. A
corporate employer's president and vice president fit the definition because they
acted directly in the interest of the employer in dealing with employee. Stubl v.
T.A. Systems, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1075, 1083 (E.D. Mich. 1997). In one hospital, an
employee's immediate supervisor, the supervisor's supervisor and the vice
president of human resources were all capable of denying an employee her right
to leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act and were therefore deemed
employers under the Family and Medical Leave Act's definition of employer.
Freeman v. Foley, 911 F. Supp. 326, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Compare these with
Johnson v. A.P. Products, Ltd., 934 F. Supp. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), where a
human resources manager was not an employer under the Family and Medical
Leave Act because he did not exercise control over the employee's ability to
obtain leave.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (1993).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (1993). The period of twelve months is crucial for
determining if an employee has a right of action. If the employer makes the
decision to terminate the employee before the twelve-month period passes but
fails to actually discharge the employee until just after the one year mark, the
employee is no longer an "eligible employee," and is therefore unprotected under
the Family and Medical Leave Act. Coleman v. Prudential Relocation, 975 F.
Supp. 234, 245 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
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same employer.2' A federal officer or an employee under Title five,
chapter sixty-three, subchapter V is excluded from eligibility. 26
To qualify for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, the
employee must request leave for one of four reasons.27 The employee's
request for leave must be:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee
and in order to care for such son or daughter[,]
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the
employee for adoption or foster care[,]
(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter or parent,
of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a
serious health condition[, or]
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of
such employee. 8
If all other conditions are satisfied and if an employee meets one of these
criteria, the employee is entitled to leave. 9 An employee shall not take
leave intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule unless the employer
and the employee agree.3° If the intermittent leave requested by the
employee is due to planned medical treatment, an employer may require
the employee to transfer temporarily to an alternative position that is
equivalent in pay and benefits but better accommodates the intervals of
leave.31 In such situations, the employee must make every reasonable
effort to schedule the medical treatment so that it does not disrupt the
32employer's operations. The employee must give at least thirty days
25. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B) (1993).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (1993).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(D) (1993).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). See, e.g., Cox v. Autozone, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1369,
1381 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (stating that the Family and Medical Leave Act provides a
total of twelve weeks of leave, not in addition to the leave already provided by the
employer).
One interesting note is that while an employer is required to give an employee
leave to care for a seriously ill child under the Family and Medical Leave Act, an
employer is not required under the same statute to give an employee bereavement
leave. Beal v. Rubermaid Commercial Products Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1216, 1226
(S.D. Iowa 1997).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1) (1993). Congress defines intermittent leave as
irregular, periodic or sporadic, as compared to planned leave.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(2) (1993).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2). See, e.g. Williams v. Shenango, Inc., 986 F. Supp.
2000]
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notice for foreseeable leave, especially for planned medical treatment
and, if possible, for childbirth.33 If the leave is due to an unexpected
condition, the employee shall provide notice to the extent practicable.34
The employer may require certification for leave due to a serious health
condition,35 and may request a second opinion at the employer's expense
if it doubts the validity of the certification.36
The employee's choice of intermittent leave does not reduce the total
amount of leave the employee is entitled to under the Family and Medical
Leave Act.37 The leave may be unpaid if the employer provides fewer
than twelve work-weeks of paid leave.38 While on leave, the employer
must maintain the employee's group health benefits. Upon return from
leave, the employee is entitled to be restored to the position of
employment held before leave or to an equivalent position with
309, 320 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (determining that employer has an obligation to inquire
further into the details surrounding a request for leave when the Family and
Medical Leave Act may be involved).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1)-(2) (1993).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1) (1993).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (1993). An employer may deny leave based on the
employee's doctor's prior certification that the employee was not qualified for
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Stoops v. One Call
Communications, Inc., 141 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1998).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c) (1993). An employer is not obligated to grant
employee leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act solely because a doctor
has certified the employee's medical condition. Compare Stoops, 141 F.3d at 313
(7th Cir. 1998) (allowing employer to deny Family and Medical Leave Act leave
where employer knows employee's reason for absence, based on a doctor's
certification, did not qualify under the Family and Medical Leave Act) with Diaz
v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corporation., 131 F.3d 711, 713-714 (7th Cir. 1997)
(determining that the employee was still required to obtain a second opinion even
though employee was out of the country).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b) (1993).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(1) (1993). If the employer intends for employee leave
to be included in the allotment designated in the Family and Medical Leave Act, it
should be explicit. The Fourth Circuit determined that a form used in requesting
leave did not provide sufficient notice that the employer intended to include
employee's vacation days in his or her eligible entitlement under the Family and
Medical Leave Act because the form only referenced medical leave, not vacation
leave. Cline v. Wal-Mart, 144 F.3d 294, 300-301 (4th Cir. 1998). The court
reasoned that a reasonable employee would not be put on notice that his vacation
days were meant to be included under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Id.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c) (1993).
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equivalent benefits.
It is unlawful for an employer to interfere with the rights provided
under the Act or to discriminate against an employee who opposes any
practice by the employer that was made unlawful by the Act.41  An
employee has an express right to enforcement of the Family and Medical
42Leave Act. An employee has a right of action in any Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction.4 An employee may sue to recover
damages which may include the amount of wages lost or actual monetary
losses sustained as a direct result of the violation."
B. Congressional Intent and Basis for Enactment
After years of planning and debate, Congress enacted the Family and
Medical Leave Act in 1993 to equalize the burdens of family care on
parents while securing jobs for employees who choose family care over
41work . In its findings, Congress found that the number of single parent or
multiple parent households in which both parents work was on the rise.46
Congress also found that it was important "for the development of
children and the family unit" that both parents be able to participate in
child raising and care of seriously ill family members.47 Congress found
that the ability of parents to care for their family members was
jeopardized because the current employment atmosphere forced parents
48
to choose between their job security and their responsibilities as parents.
In addition, for employees with a serious health condition that prevents
40. 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (1993). An employer may also substitute another person
in the absent employee's position while employee is on leave. Brown v. J.C.
Penney Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (S.D. Fla. 1996). Upon return from leave,
an employee is not entitled to extra assurances of job permanence not available
before the leave was taken. Lempres v. CBS Inc., 916 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D.D.C.
1996).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1993). When an employee requests leave, all that is
relevant is whether the employee was granted entitlement under the Family and
Medical Leave Act. Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp.
1108, 1121-1122 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); McClain v. Southwest Steel Co., Inc., 940 F.
Supp. 295, 299-300 (N.D. Okla. 1996).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) (1993).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (1993).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(I)(II) (1993).
45. See Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465,474 (D.
Kan. 1996).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1) (1993).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (1993).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(3) (1993).
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them from working for temporary periods, there was less than adequate
job security. Congress further found that the role of caretaking
primarily falls on women, affecting their working lives more than men's. °
Finally, Congress found that employment standards which apply more to
one gender over another "have serious potential for encouraging
employers to discriminate against employees and applicants for
employment who are of that gender."'"
Congress attempted to minimize this potential for discrimination by
passing the Family and Medical Leave Act in a manner "consistent with
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.,12  The
purposes of the Family and Medical Leave Act are:
(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of
families, to promote the stability and economic security of
families, and to promote national interests in preserving family
integrity;
(2) to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical
reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a
child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition[.]"
These purposes served as a compromise to accommodate the legitimate
interests of the employer while ensuring minimal discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment and promoting equal employment for men and
54women.
Congress professed that the Family and Medical Leave Act was
enacted pursuant to its Section five powers." Since the statute covers
States as employers, it provides that a State may be sued for damages for
failure to grant leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. In short,
Congress attempted to abrogate the States' immunity from suit ensured to
it by the Eleventh Amendment and the sovereign immunity values in the
Constitution. 6 This Comment examines whether the Family Medical
Leave Act represents a valid exercise of congressional power under
49. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(4) (1993).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (1993).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(6) (1993).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (1993). See discussion infra section II(A)(1).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(l)- (2) (1993).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3)-(5) (1993).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (1993). The focus of this Comment is that Congress
failed in its attempt to pass the Family and Medical Leave Act in a manner
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. A discussion of this failure begins in
section II(B).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
II. A STATE'S RIGHT TO IMMUNITYFROM SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT
A. Sovereign Immunity Under the Eleventh Amendment
Historically, each State is sovereign and not "amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent."57  Sovereign immunity has been an
absolute right of States for centuries." Only consent by the sovereign
could abolish this immunity. 9  A sovereign entity could waive its
immunity from suit if it so chose. 6°
The writers of the Constitution "considered immunity from private
suits central to sovereign dignity.",6' From its creation, the Constitution
has "specifically recognize[d] the States as sovereign entities[.]"62
According to the Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine,
[t]he phrase [Eleventh Amendment Immunity] is convenient
shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign
immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by,
the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the
Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative
interpretations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity
from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the
States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and
which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their
admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other
States) except as altered by the plan of the Convention or
certain constitutional Amendments.
The Constitution's federal system preserves each State's sovereignty in
two ways: by reserving a portion of the Nation's sovereignty and by
rejecting a central government for a system of state and federal
governments coexisting to govern the people."' Therefore, the States
57. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81
(Alexander Hamilton)).
58. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979).
59. Id.
60. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
61. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
62. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71, n.15 (1996).
63. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
64. Id. at 714. The Supreme Court further expanded on this idea. The
Constitution reserved for the States not only a large part of the Nation's
sovereignty, but also "the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status."
2000]
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preserve "'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.' They are not relegated
to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the
dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty."" The Constitution
gave Congress "the power to regulate individuals, not states.,
66
The States' principle of sovereign immunity is so basic within our
system it does not need to be formally asserted in court.67 The Tenth
68Amendment quells any doubts about the States' sovereign immunity.
The Tenth Amendment reads, "[T]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people. 69 This Amendment was
enacted "to allay lingering concerns about the extent of the national
power., 7) The express language of the Tenth Amendment, coupled with
the Constitution's history, reinforces the principle that the States enjoy
sovereign immunity regardless of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of sovereign immunity in
1793. In Chisholm v. Georgia, the Court upheld a citizen's right to sue the
State of Georgia in a private suit without the State's consent.7 Five
justices, four of whom wrote separate concurring opinions, agreed that the
case fell within the literal language of Article III, which grants jurisdiction
"between a State and Citizens of another State[.] 72 Two justices went so
far as to argue that sovereign immunity was inconsistent with the
Id. The States are each a distinct and independent portion of the Nation and are
not subject to the Nation's authority to any larger respect than the Nation is
subject to them. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison)). In
addition, the design of the Constitution embraced a system of coexistence
whereby both governments would exercise "concurrent authority over the
people . . . 'the only proper subjects of government."' Id. (quoting Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-20 (1997) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 15 at 109
(Alexander Hamilton))).
65. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715.
66. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
67. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890) ("The suability of a State, without
its consent, was a thing unknown to the law. This has been so often laid down and
acknowledged by courts and jurists that is hardly necessary to be formally
asserted.").
68. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
70. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714. See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919
(1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156-59, 177 (1992).
71. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
72. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, as cited in Alden, 527 U.S. at 714.
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Constitution's principle of popular sovereignty." The others agreed that
the text of the Constitution, particularly Article III, "evidenced the States'
surrender of sovereign immunity as to those provisions extending
jurisdiction over suits to which States were parties[.]" 74
The Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm was heavily criticized7 ' and
served as a catalyst for the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. In
the next session of Congress, the Eleventh Amendment was proposed.76
The amendment, in effect, reversed the Supreme Court's decision in
Chisholm." Congress intended to return the Constitution to its original
78design. Congress argued that the Constitution was understood "to
preserve the States' traditional immunity from private suits. 79  The
Constitution would have failed ratification "if the States and their courts
were to be stripped of their sovereign authority except as expressly
provided by the Constitution itself."' The Eleventh Amendment passed
both the House and the Senate swiftly, defeating all attempts to weaken
it." The original understanding was that sovereign immunity would be
intact after ratification of the Constitution, so ratification of the
Amendment only served to reinforce that understanding.
The Eleventh Amendment served only to reconfirm the historic
principle of States' sovereign immunity. 3 The Supreme Court explained
this intent in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida:8
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict
only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts,
"we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so
much for what it says but for the presupposition.., which it
confirms." That presupposition, first observed over a century
ago in Hans v. Louisiana, has 2 parts: first, that each State is a
73. Alden, 527 U.S. at 719 (citing Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 454-458,470-472).
74. Alden, 527 U.S. at 719 (citing Chihsolm, 2 U.S. at 452, 468).
75. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Alden, 527 U.S. at 722.
79. Id. at 724.
80. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239 n.2 (1985).
81. Alden, 527 U.S. at 721 (citing 4 Annals of Congress 25, 30-31, 476-478).
82. Alden, 527 U.S. at 726. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12, 14-15, 18-19
(1890); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660 (1974); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 70
nn.12-13 (1996).
83. Alden, 527 U.S. at 728-729.
84. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that "'it is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent[.]'
85
Therefore, each State maintains a presumptive right of sovereign
immunity. Only through express waiver or explicit abrogation by
Congress will a State be amenable to suit.
B The Process By Which Congress May Abrogate the State's
Immunity from Suit in Federal Court
Congress may not enact legislation on a whim which abrogates the
States' immunity. Because of the importance of State sovereignty,
Congress must follow a specific process for an abrogation to meet
constitutional requirements. First, Congress must make its intention to
abrogate sovereign immunity unmistakably clear in the language of the
legislation.86 Second, Congress must appropriately exercise its Section
five power, the only power that enables Congress to abrogate State
sovereign immunity. 87 Finally, the legislation must be a valid exercise of
the Section five power.88
1. Congress' Intent to Abrogate Must be Unmistakably Clear
in the Language of the Legislation
The threshold question is whether Congress' intent to abrogate is
unmistakably clear through the language of the legislation.8' The
Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he fundamental nature of the interests
implicated by the Eleventh Amendment dictates this conclusion."9
Congress' intent must be "obvious from 'a clear legislative statement."' 9
85. Id. at 54 (1996) (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 13 (emphasis deleted), quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (citations omitted)).
86. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
87. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
88. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). In Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000), the Court reiterated that "the determination
whether purportedly prophylactic legislation constitutes appropriate remedial
legislation, or instead effects a substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth
Amendment right at issue, is often difficult." Id. at 644. With this in mind, the
Court developed the congruence and proportionality test to help determine the
line between the two types of legislation. Id.
89. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 242.
90. Id.
91. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (quoting
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 US. 775, 786 (1991)).
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In Dellmuth v. Muth, the Supreme Court noted that
[t]o temper Congress' acknowledged powers of abrogation with
due concern for the Eleventh Amendment's role as an essential
component of our constitutional structure, we have applied a
simple but stringent test: "Congress may abrogate the States'
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only
by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute." 92
For a statute to constitute a waiver of immunity, "it must specify the
States' intention to subject itself to suit in federal court." 93 Congress must
do more than grant jurisdiction via the language of the statute.94 Only by
making its intention unmistakably clear may Congress abrogate the
States' immunity.95
The Supreme Court has held that Congress made its intent
unmistakably clear in several pieces of legislation. For example, the
Court found that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 96 (IGRA) contained
an unmistakably clear statement of Congress' intention to abrogate the
States' immunity, even though the statute does not expressly mention the
States' immunity.7 The IGRA places the burden of proof upon the State
to determine whether the State acted in good faith. For the Court, this
language indicated an unmistakably clear statement of intent.98 The Court
also found that Congress' intention in enacting the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 196799 (ADEA) was to extend its application to the
States.1°° The ADEA incorporates provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act10' (FLSA) for the purpose of authorizing private actions against the
State without the State's consent.0 2 In addition, the Court found that the
92. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989).
93. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 241. See also Smith v. Reeves, 178
U.S. 436, 441 (1900); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54
(1944).
94. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786 n.4.
95. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 227-28.
96. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 et seq. (1993).
97. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,56 (1996).
98. Id.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1993).
100. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 637 (2000).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1993).
102. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). In its recent decision, Kimel,
the Court held that the ADEA's application was extended to the States by a
simple amendment of the definition of employer under the Fair Labor Standards
act to include "a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or
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Patent Remedy Act 03 (PRA) was intended by Congress to abrogate the
States' immunity.1 O° The Court concluded that based on the language of
the PRA, Congress' intent could not have been clearer.
Legislation passed under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment is
proper if it is passed to enforce the provisions of the Amendment' 6 In
light of the history of Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
discussed supra, it is commonly held that Congress has the authority to
enact legislation that guarantees the enforcement of a right guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 If there is a Fourteenth Amendment right
at issue, Congress may properly enact legislation to enforce that right.11
According to the Family and Medical Leave Act, the ultimate purpose
of the Act is "to promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for
women and men[.]"'9 Congress clearly linked this unmistakable intent to
the Fourteenth Amendment in concluding that one of the purposes of the
Family and Medical Leave Act is to accomplish equal treatment in the
workplace in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."0 In the Act, Congress also established a right
instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State." Id. at 637 (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1993)). Although concluding this was Congress' intent, the
Court further held that the ADEA was an unconstitutional abrogation of the
States' immunity from private suit under Section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 637.
103. 35 U.S.C.S. § 271 et seq. (2000).
104. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
105. Id. According to the PRA, "Any State... shall not be immune, under
the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in federal court.., for
infringement of a patent." 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (2000) (quoted in Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 635). Similar to its decision in
Kimel, the Court again found that the PRA was an unconstitutional abrogation of
the States' immunity from suit by a private individual under Section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
at 630.
106. See, e.g. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997), where the
Court upheld Congress' power to enact legislation under Section five that
enforced the constitutional right to freedom of religion.
107. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 637
(quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996)).
108. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 639.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(5) (1993). See also Thomson v. Ohio State Univ.
Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (1993).
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of action for aggrieved employees. Employees may sue to recover
damages or equitable relief against employers in any federal or state court
of competent jurisdiction, even if the employer is a public agency."' By
including the States in the definition of employer and then providing
employees with a right of action against their employers, Congress made
its intent to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute.?
2
2. Congress Must Act in a Valid Exercise of Section Five
Power
After establishing the unmistakably clear intent of Congress, courts ask
whether "the act in question [was] passed pursuant to a constitutional
provision granting Congress the power to abrogate[.] ' ,1 3 The Supreme
Court has held that only two provisions of the Constitution permit
Congress to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity."4 First,
Congress at one time was understood to possess the power to abrogate
the States' immunity pursuant to its Article I powers.115 An example of
this approach can be found in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas,"6  where
Congress abrogated the States' sovereign immunity pursuant to its power
to regulate interstate commerce under Article I, Section eight. In that
case, the Court stated "the power to regulate interstate commerce would
be 'incomplete without the authority to render States liable in
111. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (1993).
112. H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, at 70 (1993) ("All types of employers above the 50-
employee threshold, including State and local governments, are covered -
regardless of the nature of their operations.").
113. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996). See also
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976). The decision of the Court in
Seminole Tribe departs from the traditional factors that were used to determine
whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power. The old test, as
pronounced in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), was three pronged:
first, whether the statute may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the equal
protection clause; second, whether it is plainly adapted to an identified Fourteenth
Amendment purpose; and third, whether it is not prohibited by, but is consistent
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Id. at 649-58. Congress did not
reverse the Morgan standards, but simply consolidated the three prongs into one
question in Seminole Tribe. As will be discussed later, the Court further modified
the test in Flores to one of congruency and proportionality. City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
114. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
115. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
116. Id.
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damages.""' 1 7  The Supreme Court overruled this interpretation in
Seminole Tribe."8  There, the Court recognized that "the Eleventh
Amendment restricts judicial power under Article III, and Article I
cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon
federal jurisdiction."
1 9
The second provision of the Constitution under which Congress may
abrogate the States' immunity from suit is the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
altered the balance between state and federal power by expanding federal
power at the expense of state autonomy. The Court recognized that the
Fourteenth Amendment included provisions expressly prohibiting state
action."' In addition, Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives
Congress the power to enforce the provisions of the Amendment through
appropriate legislation. 2' As interpreted in Seminole Tribe, Fitzpatrick
held "that through the Fourteenth Amendment, federal power extended
to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore
that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the
immunity from suit guaranteed by that Amendment.
12
1
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the States' immunity is
limited by the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As Justice Rehnquist wrote:
In [the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment]
Congress is expressly granted the authority to enforce "by
appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant
limitations on [S]tate authority. When Congress acts pursuant
to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is
plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is
exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional
Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody
limitations on [S]tate authority. We think that Congress may, in
determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide
for private suits against States or state officials which are
117. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (quoting Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20).
118. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
119. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
120. Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
121. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453.
122. Id. at 453 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
123. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
124. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
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125constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.
Recent federalism cases have followed this holding, reaffirming that
Congress has discretion to enact laws to enforce the rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in Seminole Tribe, the
Supreme Court determined that congressional authority to abrogate the
States' immunity was historically upheld under Section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 12 In Flores, the Court repeated the idea that
Section five is a "'positive grant of legislative power' to Congress." '27 The
Court, quoting Ex Parte Virginia, further defined the scope of Congress'
powers under Section five:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out
the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to
enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to
secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial
or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power.' 28
Finally, in Alden v. Maine, the Court held that the States were required to
"surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had been preserved to them
by the original Constitution, so that Congress may authorize private suits
against nonconsenting States pursuant to its Section 5 enforcement
power.' 29 Based on constitutional case law, Congress appears to have the
authority under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact
legislation which abrogates the States' immunity from private suit. 3°
125. Id.
126. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
127. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997) (quoting Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
128. Flores, 521 U.S. at 517-18 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-
46 (1880)).
129. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,756 (1999).
130. This sentiment was echoed in other cases in which the court reaffirmed
the idea that Section five amounted to a positive grant of power, authorizing
Congress to permit private persons to bring suits against the States. See, e.g.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631, 644 (2000) ("Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, however, does grant Congress the authority to abrogate
the States' sovereign immunity."); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) ("Congress may authorize [a suit by
an individual against a State] in the exercise of its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment - an Amendment enacted after the Eleventh
Amendment and specifically designed to alter the federal-state balance."); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savi. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637
(1999) ("Congress retains the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
2000]
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3. Legislation Must Be a "Valid Exercise of Power"
Once it is established that Congress intented to abrogate the States'
immunity from prosecution and that Congress validly exercised its Section
five power, the remaining question is whether the exercise of Section five
power is valid.' Until 1996, the Supreme Court decision in Morgan set
the standard for a valid exercise of Section five power. Under this test,
Congress had to act under proper constitutional authority and make its
intention to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity unmistakably clear
in the express language of the statute . 3
However, in 1997 the Supreme Court embarked on a new approach inFl 133
Flores. According to the Supreme Court, there must now be a showing
that Congress' action was a congruent and proportional response to the
violation of a protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress may abrogate the States' immunity from suit under the power of
the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by creating
legislation aimed to remedy or prevent a pattern of unconstitutional
discrimination.13 1 Under the Court's mandate, legislation that abrogates
the States' immunity from suit is congruent to a proscription in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the abrogation of the States'
immunity from suit must be a proportionate response to the pattern of
unconstitutional behavior. 13 There are two steps required to prove that
the abrogation is a proportional response to the pattern of
unconstitutional behavior. First, there must be a pattern of
unconstitutional behavior.137  Second, the legislation must be closely
tailored to remedy or prevent such conduct.
3
1
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.").
131. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 637
(interpreting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
132. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
133. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
134. Id. at 520. Congress must have the authority to enact the legislation
which divests the States' of their sovereign immunity. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.
64, 68 (1985).
135. Flores, 521 U.S. at 518.
136. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 639.
137. Id. at 638.
138. Id.
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III. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS IT APPLIES TO STATES AS EMPLOYERS BECAUSE IT IMPROPERLY
ABROGATES THE STATES' IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
A. The Family and Medical Leave Act was Not Aimed at Preventing
or Remedying a Pattern of Unconstitutional Behavior and Therefore It
Lacks Congruence
Congress' first step in enacting remedial legislation congruent and
proportional to the injury of a protected right under the Fourteenth
Amendment is to identify the evil or wrong the legislation attempts to
remedy. 9 Congress must consider the evil or wrong in light of its
historical background. 4 0  Unless the evil involves an unconstitutional
discrimination of a suspect class, the proportional response must meet the
rational basis test. To meet the rational basis test, the potentially
discriminatory legislation must be rationally related to a legitimate State
interest. 4 ' To determine whether unconstitutional discrimination exists,
the Court looks at the legislative history to see if there is a record of
142unconstitutional conduct that the legislation attempts to remedy.
The objective of the Family and Medical Leave Act seeks to achieve is
not prevention or remedy of a pattern of unconstitutional behavior. Both
Houses of Congress were in rare agreement on posing legislation that
corrected the current state of employment. The House of
Representatives determined that:
[P]rivate sector practices and government policies have failed to
adequately respond to recent economic and social changes that
have intensified the tensions between work and family. This
failure continues to impose a heavy burden on families,
employees, employers and the broader society. [This bill]
provides a sensible response to the growing conflict between
139. Id. (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 525).
140. Flores, 521 U.S. at 525.
141. See, e.g. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
142. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631, 645 (2000). The Court
summarized its rationale behind Flores, noting that "the legislative record
contained very little evidence of the unconstitutional conduct purportedly
targeted by RFRA's substantive provisions." Id. at 645. In Kimel, the Court also
explained its reasoning in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank, where the Court held that in the legislative record
of the Patent Remedy Act "Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement
by the [S]tates, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations." Id. at 640.
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work and family by establishing a right to unpaid family and
medical leave for all workers covered under the act.
143
The Family and Medical Leave Act thus seeks to achieve the objective of
accommodating important societal interests by setting a minimum
standard for leave.'"
One of the overriding needs cited for the enactment of the Family and
Medical Leave Act was the report from the General Accounting Office
(GAO) that the female civilian labor force is increasing at a rate of one
million per year. 4' The GAO stated that demographic changes in
employment rates coupled with new responsibilities in caring for families
and relatives has led to "emotionally and physically deprived children and
adults.
, 46
Congressional testimony indicated that there is inequality in the
workplace between genders. Ms. Beverly Wilkinson, a former secretary,
testified that she lost her job when her company downsized while she was
on maternity leave.47 Ms. Rebecca Webb, a television anchor, lost her job
because her employer did not have policy for maternity leave. Ms.
Carmen Maya, a pharmacy technician, lost her job because she needed
special arrangements, including twelve weeks of leave, to care for her
child's medical condition and her own medical condition. 149 Mr. Thomas
Riley lost his job as a supervisor at a jewelry manufacturing company
because he took six days off during the final six months of his son's life,
while still managing to put in fifty-hour weeks."
Although poignant and heart-wrenching, these stories do not justify
enactment of the Family and Medical Leave Act. As the Minority stated
143. H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, at 21(1993). S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 4 (1993) contains
a nearly identical paragraph.
144. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 4 (1993); H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, at 21 (1993).
145. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 5 (1993); H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, at 22 (1993). Both
reports also cited other "dramatic" statistics of women entering the workforce.
These reports predicted that by the year 2000, two out of every three new workers
will be female. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 5 (1993); H.R. Rep. No 103-8, at 23 (1993).
In 1988, single parent households accounted for twenty-seven percent for family
groups with minor children. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 5 (1993); H.R. Rep. No 103-8, at
23 (1993). Americans are living longer than ever, and the percentage of adults
who care of their ailing parents is growing. S. Rep. No. 103-3,at 5 (1993); H.R.
Rep. No 103-8, at 23 (1993).
146. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 7 (1993). See H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, at 24 (1993).
147. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 8 (1993); H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, at 24 (1993).
148. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 8 (1993).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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in House Report 103-8 part 1, "[H.R. 1] is a legislative initiative in search
of a problem to solve.''. Congress never identified any pattern of
unconstitutional gender discrimination by the States. For Congress to
defend gender-based legislation, it must demonstrate an "exceedingly
persuasive justification.,1 2 Congress must show that gender classification
serves an important government interest and that the discriminatory
means used by the States are substantially related to that interest. 153
However, Congress may not rely on overbroad generalizations about
males and females that will create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women to justify its reason for supporting the
Family and Medical Leave Act."'
It is not debated that Congress' genuine interest is to eliminate gender
discrimination. But Congress does not present sufficient justification to
support passage of the legislation. Furthermore, the discriminatory
means used are not substantially related to the promotion of that interest.
Congress' means of achieving the stated end were overbroad. Congress
passed the Family and Medical Leave Act because the public demanded
leave so that women and men could meet the demands of work and home,
a need businesses have not met on their own.' A demand for legislation
cannot meet the proper justification under the enforcement clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
There exists no disparaging gap between genders when it comes to who
receives leave and who is denied. Rather, research demonstrates that
when employers deny leave, they do so on a case by case basis, usually
determined by the amount of leave requested by the employee.'
Because no violation of a Fourteenth Amendment right was established,
Congress' legislation did not seek to remedy any difference in employers'
dispensation of leave between males and females. Rather, the legislation
attempted to provide appropriate leave for all workers. The evidence
supporting the requisite inequality position is scant, and therefore, the
151. H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, at 58 (1993).
152. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
153. Id. at 533.
154. Id.
155. H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, at 58 (1993).
156. This conclusion is drawn from the testimony and statistics cited in H.R.
Rep. No. 103-8 (1993) and S. Rep. No. 103-3 (1993). Neither report provides
evidence that persons were denied leave and consequently lost their jobs due to
their gender. For most families, demographic changes require that both parents
work. The effects of a parent losing his or her job, especially due to care-giving
reasons, are difficult to manage. H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, at 24 (1993).
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Family and Medical Leave Act cannot be sustained under Section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Employers may not be overly responsive to their employees' needs, but
employer unresponsiveness does not warrant such extreme action. In
1991 the Bureau of Labor Statistics conducted a study of employers with
more than 100 employees.117 The study revealed that "ninety-six percent
provided paid vacation, sixty-seven percent provided paid sick leave, and
thirty-seven percent provided unpaid maternity leave."'58 The GAO also
testified that many employers without formal policies tend to
accommodate employees as best they can. 5 9
The Family and Medical Leave Act is estimated to cover only fifty
percent of the workforce and a mere five percent of the nation's
businesses.' 6 Additionally, since the guaranteed leave is unpaid leave,
only those who could make ends meet without a paycheck can take• • , 161
advantage of the provisions for leave. The bill, in essence, has very little
beneficial effect.' 62 This lack of beneficial effect is compounded by the
extraordinary costs placed on employers. As of February 1, 1993, the
GAO estimated that the cost of leave to employers was at least $647
million each year. In 1991 the Small Business Administration estimated
that six weeks of maternity leave and infant care would cost $612 million
annually.'9 These cost estimates only include health care costs; they fail
to include recruitment, replacement and training costs for the business or
lost profits due to an employee's extended absence. In addition, many
employers are beginning to offer "pot-luck benefits,' ' 66 but this legislation
will force employers to either cease their current benefit plan or reduce
their plan, a plan the employees may prefer. There are also public costswhich must be considered. Since state and local governments are
157. H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, at 59 (1993).
158. Id.
159. Id.




164. Id. at 61.
165. Id. at 61-62.
166. "Pot-luck benefit plans"or "cafeteria plans" are plans where the
employer offers the employee a wide variety of benefits and the employee selects
the one most suitable to his or her needs. These plans are more flexible, offering
the employees a choice in their coverage.
167. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 50 (1993).
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included in the Family and Medical Leave Act, the costs will be paid for
either through cuts in services or increased taxes.' 68
This is not to say that a problem in America does not exist with respect
to the terms of coverage for family and medical leave. But congressional
testimony and government statistics indicate that Congress' intention was
not to prevent discrimination between genders in the work place, but
rather to provide leave for all persons for family and medical needs. This
aim is not a protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment. American
citizens are not guaranteed the right to take unpaid sick leave to care for
their dying mother under the Fourteenth Amendment. While this
legislation makes sense morally, it does not pass constitutional muster.
Congress cannot abrogate a State's right to sovereign immunity in order
to protect an employee's right to leave under these circumstances.
Analysis of the congruence element of the congruence and
proportionality test for abrogation of sovereign immunity is best
explained by example. The constitutionality of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993169 (RFRA) was successfully challenged in
Flores.70 Congress enacted the legislation in response to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, 7 which eliminated the
condition that the government "justify burdens of religious exercise
imposed by laws neutral toward religion.' 7  Congress concluded that
State governments should not be able to significantly burden a person's
religious exercise without compelling justification.' The legislative
history demonstrated an attempt to eliminate the general laws which
place incidental burdens on religious exercise, not to eliminate religious
174persecution in this country.
The Court in Flores found that the legislation's history made it
"difficult to maintain that [the testimonies and laws] are examples of
legislation enacted or enforced due to animus or hostility to the burdened
religious practices or that they indicate a widespread pattern of religious
discrimination in this country.', 75 The Court determined that Congress'
168. H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, at 63 (1993).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2000).
170. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
171. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
172. Flores, 521 U.S. at 515 (1997) (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990)).
173. Flores, 521 U.S. at 515 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (2000)).
174. Flores, 521 U.S. at 530-31.
175. Id. at 531.
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concern went only to the burdens imposed incidentally by other laws.
The RFRA was deemed to be neither remedial nor preventive legislation
because it was not an attempt to prevent or to respond to unconstitutional
behavior.'7 Remedial legislation "should be adapted to the mischief and
wrong which the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to provide
against." 1
78
The Supreme Court also applied the congruence and proportionality
test in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank. 79 The Supreme Court held that the Patent Remedy Act""
(PRA) was unconstitutional because the abrogation of the States'
sovereign immunity through legislation designed to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause was improper.18 The
legislative history of the PRA revealed that the PRA's basic aims were
"to provide a uniform remedy for patent infringement and to place States
on the same footing as private parties under that regime.' '82 The concerns
expressed by Congress were not aimed at preventing or remedying a
violation of a protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment. 83
Because the goal was not to protect a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the means taken were not sufficient to withstand
constitutional challenge and the PRA failed the congruence and
proportionality test.
B. Congress' Actions Were Not Proportional to the Behavior on the
Record
Once identified, the steps taken by Congress to remedy the evil must be
analyzed to determine whether the congruence between "the means used
and the ends to be achieved" is proportional.' 84  "Strong measures
appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to
another, lesser one."'' 85  This balancing test of congruence and
proportionality exists to determine whether the legislation functions to
protect Fourteenth Amendment rights or to create rights not established
176. Id.
177. Id. at 532.
178. Id. (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883)).
179. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
180. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (2000).
181. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 645-48.
182. Id. at 647-48.
183. Id. at 643.
184. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
185. Id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966)).
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by the Fourteenth Amendment.
11
6
When examining Congress' power, it is important to remember that
Congress' enforcement power under Section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment is remedial in nature. 187  "Legislation which deters or
remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress'
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not
itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the States."" 8 However, this power to abrogate
States' immunity is not unlimited. The Supreme Court has held that
"Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the
right is. It has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. ' ' 9° A line exists
between "measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and
measures that make a substantive change in the governing law"' 9' and
although Congress has wide latitude to determine where it is, the line
must be observed. To enact valid legislation pursuant to Section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the legislation must be remedial and
preventive in nature.'9 Congress "must identify conduct transgressing the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its
legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct." '193
Congress failed these requirements when it passed the RFRA. As the
Supreme Court determined in Flores, the RFRA's substantial costs far
exceeded any unconstitutional conduct, and the legislation's imposition of
a least restrictive means requirement indicated that the means used in the
RFRA were broader than what is appropriate to prevent and remedy
constitutional violations.'9 4  As such, the RFRA was declared
unconstitutional.19
5
The most recent example of the application of the proportionality test
can be found in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents. 96 The Supreme Court
186. Flores, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
187. Id. at 519.
188. Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
189. Flores, 521 U.S. at 518.
190. Id. at 519.
191. Id. at 519-20.
192. Id. at 524.
193. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 639 (1999).
194. Flores, 521 U.S. at 534-35.
195. Id. at 536.
196. 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000).
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declared the ADEA unconstitutional for failure to validly abrogate the
States' sovereign immunity'9 Passing the first requirement of abrogation,
the Supreme Court noted that Congress had clearly demonstrated its
intent to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity in the express language
of the ADEA 9 8 Unfortunately, the ADEA failed the proportionality
test. Specifically, the Court held that the ADEA was not "appropriate
legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."'" The Court held
that "judged against the backdrop of our equal protection jurisprudence,
it is clear that the ADEA is 'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial
or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. ' '' 20 As with the RFRA
and the PRA, the ADEA has fallen victim to the new interpretation of
valid abrogation of the States' sovereign immunity.
As the ADEA was so out of proportion, so too is the Family and
Medical Leave Act. Although the stated aim was to eradicate gender
discrimination, the Family and Medical Leave Act, on its face, fails to
remedy sufficient unconstitutional behavior to warrant the extreme action
of abrogation. There are few instances where the statute references
gender discrimination. Congress addressed the finding that women take
primary responsibility for the care of the family, affecting their working
lives more than men.2 01 Congress also acknowledged that single-gender
employment standards have the potential for encouraging employers to
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discriminate against employees of that gender. But Congress seeks to
balance the needs of employees to serve their families better by providing
leave for medical and compelling family reasons.2°3 The proportion of
unconstitutional discrimination prevented by the Family and Medical
Leave Act is minuscule in proportion to the constitutional behavior
prohibited by forcing employers to grant leave for employees in these
situations.
CONCLUSION
The Family and Medical Leave Act attempts to correct a pressing
public issue. Americans are tired of being forced to place their job
197. Id. at 637.
198. Id. at 640.
199. Id. at 645 (citation omitted).
200. Id. at 647 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
201. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (1993).
202. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(6) (1993).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)-(3) (1993).
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security ahead of their family responsibilities. As the congressional
record demonstrates, more and more persons are being reprimanded or
fired from their jobs due to pressing needs at home.
Although this practice raises sympathies, the discrimination does not
rise to a level that warrants abrogation of the States' sovereign immunity.
Yes, Congress had the proper authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact valid legislation. And yes, Congress made its intent
to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity unmistakably clear in the
express language of the statute. Congress' abrogation was not, however, a
congruent and proportional response to the discrimination on the record.
Simply put, the difficulties in receiving leave for family medical purposes
is a problem all employees face, regardless of gender. As such, the Family
and Medical Leave Act did not seek to protect gender inequality. Thus,
the Act did not seek to guard a right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because the Act does not validly protect a Fourteenth
Amendment right, the Family and Medical Leave Act is not congruent
and proportional legislation, and it improperly abrogates the States'
immunity from suit. Therefore the Family and Medical Leave Act is
unconstitutional as it applies to the States as employers.
Congress cannot overstep its power and go so far as to abrogate the
States' right to sovereign immunity to satisfy public opinion. Congress
may not attempt to cure a societal ill using unconstitutional means.
Americans are not left without a remedy. Citizens may compel their
States, as individual sovereign entities and employers, to provide a higher
standard of leave and job security for their employees. Congressional
action does not provide a proper remedy for the issue of family and
medical leave.
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